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I. INTRODUCTION
In Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC (“Adeyeye”), an
employer denied an employee’s request for a five-week leave of
absence for the employee to participate in his father’s funeral
ceremonies in Nigeria.1 This case exemplified the potential conflicts
surrounding religious accommodation in the workplace. Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), an employer must reasonably
accommodate an employee’s request regarding a religious practice or
observance, as long as that request does not impose an undue hardship
on the employer.2 Courts look to previous Title VII jurisprudence and
commentary to evaluate an employer’s obligation to accommodate an
employee’s request for a leave of absence rooted in that employee’s
religious practices or observances. In Adeyeye, the Seventh Circuit
 J.D. candidate, May 2014, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois
Institute of Technology; B.A., Philosophy & Religion, Colgate University. I
would like to thank Professor Hal Morris, our Executive Editor Kathleen
Mallon, and my family for all their support.
1
Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2013).
2
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e-17 (2000).
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Court of Appeals found that Heartland Sweeteners, LLC (“Heartland”)
improperly rejected Sikiru Adyeye’s request for religious
accommodation. The court’s decision epitomizes federal courts’
broader interpretation of both the qualifications of a religious tradition
and an employer’s accommodation of religious traditions in the work
place.
As federal courts implement a more tolerant approach to
employees’ religious observances those courts simultaneously
promulgate the general expansion and promotion of religious freedom
in the workplace. This trend towards more religious accommodation is
exemplified in the amendments to Title VII, the Guidelines of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), federal case
law, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion in Adeyeye.
Federal courts’ purposeful development towards employers’ broader
accommodation of employees’ religious traditions has appropriately
influenced a greater acceptance and understanding of a diverse variety
of religions in the work place. Importantly, courts’ tolerant and
progressive approach towards religious accommodation is consonant
with the freedom of religion principles established in the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The “reluctance to
require more than a de minimis accommodation by employers seems
to be inapposite to the societal goal of allowing members of all
religions to practice their faith freely.”3 For employees to experience
the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution, employers must
reasonably accommodate those employees’ religious practices and
observances.
Title VII’s requirement that employers provide reasonable
religious accommodations is closely intertwined with the freedom of
religion under the First Amendment. The First Amendment to the
United States Constitution states “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise

3

Keith S. Blair, Better Disabled Than Devout? Why Title VII Has
Failed to Provide Adequate Accommodations Against Workplace Religious
Discrimination, 63 ARK. L. REV. 515, 554 (2010).
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thereof.”4 Freedom of religion is applied to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Section 1,
which states “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”5 Enforcing employers to
comply with employees’ reasonable religious requests encourages
religious freedom in the workplace. Title VII compels employers to
reasonably accommodate employees’ religious requests while the First
Amendment simultaneously supports individuals’ rights to practice
and observe their religious traditions.6 While the Constitution protects
individuals from government intrusion into their respective religious
traditions, Title VII protects employees from religious discrimination
in the work place.7
Under Title VII, following an employee’s request for religious
accommodation, “the employer can avoid liability by showing either
that it reasonably accommodated the employee’s observance or
practice, or that accommodation of the observance or practice would
result in an undue hardship for the employer.”8 If an employer engages
in conduct prohibited by Title VII—for example, by refusing to
provide a reasonable accommodation to an employee’s religious
request—a mistreated employee may pursue a cause of action against
the employer.9 If the requested accommodation would cause the
employer an undue hardship, the accommodation would not be
4

U.S. Const. amend. I.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1.
6
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e-17 (2000); U.S. Const. amend. I.
7
JOHN JUDE MORAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: NEW CHALLENGES IN THE
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 355 (1997).
8
Donna D. Page, Veganism and Sincerely Held “Religious” Beliefs in
the Workplace: No Protection Without Definition, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
363, 367-68 (2005).
9
VERN E. HAUCK, ARBITRATING RACE, RELIGION, AND NATIONAL
ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION GRIEVANCES 12 (1997).
5
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required under Title VII.10 Questions regarding the sufficiency of an
employer’s religious accommodation or showing of undue hardship
often arise when an employee requests days off of work, perhaps due
to a weekly Sabbath observance, or as in Adeyeye, a one-off religious
ceremony.11 Whether a request for a religious accommodation is a
single or regularly scheduled occurrence, an employer’s denial of that
request may discriminate against the employee if the employer cannot
show that the employee’s absence would cause undue hardship.12
II. INTERPRETATIONS OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION FROM TITLE VII
TO ADEYEYE
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the “Act”) in
response to discrimination against racial minorities in the United
States.13 Though prompted by racial inequality in the United States,
the Act addressed discrimination based on race, religion, gender or
national origin.14 In Title VII of the Act, legislators implemented
statutory standards and protections to prevent discrimination of
employees by employers.15 Title VII stated that “[i]t shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to … discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
10

42 U.S.C. 2000e(j) (2000).
Page, supra note 8, at 367-68 (citing EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881
F.2d 1504, 1507, 1513 (9th Cir. 1989)).
12
See generally Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444
(7th Cir. 2013).
13
H.R. REP. No. 88-914 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391,
2393, 1963 WL 4735, at *3-4; Blair, supra note 3, at 521; Debbie N.
Kaminer, Title VII’s Failure to Provide Meaningful and Consistent
Protection of Religious Employees: Proposals for an Amendment, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 575, 580 (2000).
14
Blair, supra note 3, at 521; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 to 2000h-6 (2006).
15
42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17; Blair, supra note 3, at 521; see 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 to 2000h-6 (2006).
11
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respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”16 Under Title VII, if an employee requests a change
in his or her work schedule to accommodate a religious observance or
practice, the employer must provide a reasonable accommodation in
response to that employee’s request, as long as that employee’s change
in schedule or leave of absence would not cause an undue hardship for
that employer.17
1. The Purpose of Title VII
Title VII was “the first comprehensive federal employment
discrimination legislation that prohibited employment discrimination
because of, inter alia, an individual’s religion.”18 Title VII defined the
term “religion” to include “all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief.”19 The Seventh Circuit applied this
comprehensive definition when analyzing an employee’s request for
religious accommodation in Adeyeye. Nevertheless, an employee’s
request for religious accommodation is limited by Title VII, which
maintains that an employer is not obligated to fulfill an employee’s
request for religious accommodation if that “employer demonstrates
16

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
18
Bryan M. Likins, Determining the Appropriate Definition of Religion
and Obligation to Accommodate the Religious Employee Under Title VII: A
Comparison of Religious Discrimination Protection in the United States and
United Kingdom, 21 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 114-15 (2011); see
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1991);
Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2013)
(noting that “Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against
employees and job applicants based on their religion”); Smith v. N. Am.
Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515, 518 (N.D. Okla. 1970) (indicating that the
Act is “generally heralded as the first effort by the United States Government
to outlaw discrimination in private employment on the basis of race, religion,
national origin, and sex”).
19
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
17
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that he [or she] is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s
… religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the
conduct of the employer’s business.”20
2. The Impact and Results of Title VII
After the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became law, courts
consequently recognized a significant disparity between Title VII’s
prohibition of religious discrimination in the work place and any
positive requirement for an employer to accommodate an employee’s
religious practices or observances.21 For example, “the Sixth Circuit
interpreted religious discrimination in employment to require merely
treating employees the same without regard to religion.”22 The court
found that where an employer’s scheduling requirement “was
generally applicable to all employees regardless of the employees’
religious beliefs, it did not discriminate against any employee’s
religion.”23 While the original text of Title VII did not clearly place an
affirmative duty on employers to reasonably accommodate employees’
religious requests, further analysis has shown that the legislators, in
drafting Title VII, intended for Title VII to place an affirmative duty
on employers to accommodate employees’ religious requests.24
Instead, courts, such as the Sixth Circuit, found that rather than
establishing any affirmative duty, Title VII imposed “a negative duty
of not discriminating against employees based on religion.”25 That
20

Id.
Kaminer, supra note 13, at 580; see, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d mem. by an equally divided court,
402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per curiam); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583
(M.D. Fla. 1971), rev’d, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
22
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d by
an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Steven D. Jamar,
Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to Title VII and
Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 741 (1996).
23
Dewey, 429 F.2d at 330; Steven D. Jamar, supra note 22, at 741.
24
Jamar, supra note 22, at 741.
25
Id.
21
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negative duty interpretation held that where an employer provided a
religious accommodation for an employee, that employer “would be
discriminating in favor of that employee,” an act that “was deemed to
be just as prohibited as [the initial] discrimination against an
employee.”26 The negative duty interpretations of Title VII, where
courts analyzed the Act in opposition to the drafters’ intentions,
spurred appropriate responses via the EEOC Guidelines and the 1972
amendments to the Act. Prior to these 1972 amendments, “some
employers took the position that they had to apply work rules
uniformly in order to avoid allegations of religious favoritism, in spite
of the fact that such uniform enforcement frequently had an uneven
impact on the employees themselves.”27
B. Religious Observances and Practices Interpreted in Relation to
Conscientious Objectors in United States v. Seeger, (1965)
Federal courts’ first major analysis of religious accommodation
following Title VII’s enactment came from litigation surrounding
conscientious objection to the military draft. Much like the Seventh
Circuit’s analysis of Nigerian religious traditions in Adeyeye, the
courts sought a broader understanding of what constitutes a religion in
order to appropriately analyze the litigants’ claims under Title VII. The
Supreme Court, in interpreting religious and non-religious
conscientious objectors to the military draft in United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965) and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970),
broadened the characterization of “religious practices to include moral

26

Id.
Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of Provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.) and Implementing Provisions, Making Religious
Discrimination in the Workplace Unlawful, 22 A.L.R. FED. 580 (1975).
27
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or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely
held with the strength of traditional religious views.”28
In Adeyeye, the Seventh Circuit found that “United States v.
Seeger provides a helpful definition of religion: The test ‘is whether a
given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life
of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.’”29
The EEOC stated that “[i]n interpreting what qualifies as religion
under the broad statutory definition of Title VII, we have endorsed this
standard that was used in Seeger to interpret the federal statute
exempting conscientious religious objectors from military
conscription, finding that the definition serves equally well for the
purposes of Title VII.”30 The Adeyeye court further adhered to the
Seeger court’s interpretation of sincerely held religious beliefs, finding
that “[i]n such an intensely personal area, of course, the claim of the
registrant that his belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be
given great weight. … The validity of what he believes cannot be
questioned. Some theologians, and indeed some examiners, might be
tempted to question the existence of the registrant’s ‘Supreme Being’
or the truth of his concepts. But these inquiries are foreclosed to
Government.”31
In Seeger, the Court addressed Congress’s interpretation of
religious beliefs with respect to the conscientious objector statute,
finding that “Congress, in using the expression ‘Supreme Being’ rather
than the designation ‘God,’ was merely clarifying the meaning of
28

Peter Zablotsky, After the Fall: The Employer’s Duty to
Accommodate Employee Religious Practices Under Title VII After Ansonia
Board of Education v. Philbrook, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 513, 515 (1989).
29
Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 448 (7th Cir.
2013) (citing United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965).
30
Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 448 (emphasis added); see Redmond v. GAF
Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901 n. 12 (7th Cir.1978) (explaining that a religious
belief is a belief that is considered religious “in [the] person’s own scheme of
things” and is “sincerely held”).
31
Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 448 (citing Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184 (reviewing
criminal convictions for men claiming conscientious objections to military
conscription)).
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religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions and to
exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views.”32
The Court in Seeger analyzed a sincere and meaningful belief as
whether that belief “occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel
to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.”33 This analysis represents
a transition to the federal courts’ broader understanding of religious
traditions and sincerely held religious beliefs. In Seeger, the court
found that having “a conviction based upon religious training and
belief” includes “all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a
power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or
upon which all else is ultimately dependent.”34
In defining sincere religious belief, the Supreme Court in Seeger
avoided “imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious
beliefs, exempting some and excluding others, and is in accord with
the well-established congressional policy of equal treatment for those
whose opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets.”35
This all-encompassing construction of sincere religious beliefs
supports the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Adeyeye regarding Adeyeye’s
sincere and simultaneous beliefs in both Nigerian and Christian
religious traditions.
C. The 1966 EEOC Guidelines Regarding Religious Accommodation
in Response to Title VII: “Serious Inconvenience”
The 1966 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Guidelines addressed an employer’s duty to accommodate an
employee’s request for religious accommodation.36 In 1966, shortly
32

United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965).
Id. at 165-66.
34
Id. at 176.
35
Id.
36
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4 (The EEOC is “composed of five members,
not more than three of whom shall be members of the same political party.
Members of the Commission shall be appointed by the President by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate for a term of five years.” The EEOC
33
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after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC “issued a guideline
stating that, under the Act, employers had an obligation to
accommodate the religious needs of their employees when
accommodation could be achieved without serious inconvenience to
the conduct of their business.”37 These Guidelines first addressed the
duty imposed on an employer to “reasonably accommodate an
employee’s request for a change in schedule or use of vacation or
personal time due to that employee’s religious practice or
observance.”38
The Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion stated that
similar to an affirmative obligation, “the duty not to discriminate on
religious grounds includes an obligation on the part of the employer to
accommodate the reasonable religious needs of employees and, in
some cases, prospective employees where such accommodation can be
made without serious inconvenience to the conduct of the business.”39
This “serious inconvenience” standard played a significant role in
courts’ analysis of religious accommodation in the work place. The
term “serious inconvenience” set a relatively low bar for the employer
to hurdle in order to successfully deny the employee’s request for
religious accommodation without discriminating against that employee
due to the employee’s religion. The general understanding of what
constitutes a serious inconvenience, as opposed to an undue hardship,
Guidelines do not hold precedential authority over the decisions of the
Supreme Court or federal courts. However, those Guidelines do impose
persuasive authority on judicial decision-making and legislative
amendments. The purpose of the Guidelines is to advise legislators, courts
and litigants as a statement of policy. Legislators have applied some of the
standards and parameters set in the EEOC Guidelines to the amendments of
Title VII.).
37
Zablotsky, supra note 28, at 514.
38
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. §
1605.1 (1967) (codifying the 1966 Guidelines).
39
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(2) (1967); see Trans World Airlines v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 72 (1977); Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081,
1090-91 (6th Cir. 1987) (Krupansky, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1293 (1988) (emphasis added).
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further illustrates the relative ease with which an employer may
demonstrate a relatively minor hindrance related to an employee’s
religious request, and consequently deny that employee’s otherwise
reasonable and justifiable claim of religious accommodation under
Title VII.
In addition to analyzing religious accommodation, the EEOC finetuned these Guidelines as employers and courts evaluated “whether or
not a practice or belief is religious.”40 In so doing, the EEOC
Guidelines responded to employers’ and courts’ failure to recognize
the variety of religious observances and practices for which employees
seek accommodation. Finding that “Title VII’s definition of ‘religion’
[was] deficient, the EEOC, charged with administering Title VII, …
formulated its own definition of religion.”41 “[T]he Commission …
define[d] religious practices to include moral or ethical beliefs as to
what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of
traditional religious views.”42 The EEOC essentially borrowed and
applied the Supreme Court’s analysis of the religiousness and sincerity
of requests for accommodation that stemmed from the Courts’
conscientious objector decisions.43 In applying the EEOC’s definition
of religious practices in Adeyeye, where the employee identified with
both Nigerian and Christian religious traditions, the Seventh Circuit
rightfully applied a comprehensive understanding of the employee’s
religious beliefs in its analysis of religious accommodation under Title
VII.44
40

29 C.F.R. § 1605.1; 45 FR 72612, Oct. 31, 1980, unless otherwise
noted; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq.
41
Page, supra note 8, at 369.
42
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1; 45 FR 72612, Oct. 31, 1980, unless otherwise
noted; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq.
43
See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
44
“The fact that no religious group espouses [an employee’s particular
claimed] beliefs or the fact that the religious group to which the individual
professes to belong may not accept such belief will not determine whether
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D. 1967 Amendments to the 1966 EEOC Guidelines: “Undue
Hardship”
In the 1966 EEOC Guidelines, the first Guidelines the EEOC
released regarding religious accommodation in the workplace, an
employer was required to show that the religious accommodation
would present a “serious inconvenience.”45 The 1966 EEOC
Guidelines were amended in 1967, shortly after their release, and
“require[d] employers to reasonably accommodate employees’
religious needs short of undue hardship on the employer’s business.”46
The amended Guidelines stated that “the employer [has an affirmative
duty] to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of
employees and prospective employees where such accommodations
can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s
business.”47 This change in the EEOC Guidelines’ language from
“serious inconvenience” to “undue hardship,” had a significant impact
on courts’ understanding of religious accommodation under Title VII.
Specifically, these modifications addressed the necessary
conditions that permit an employer to deny an employee’s request for
the belief is a religious belief of the employee or prospective employee.” 29
C.F.R. § 1605.1; 45 FR 72612, Oct. 31, 1980, unless otherwise noted; Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; the
phrase “religious practice” as used in these Guidelines includes both
religious observances and practices, as stated in Section 701(j), 42 U.S.C.
2000e(j).
45
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1968) (codifying the 1967 Guidelines).
46
29 CFR § 1605.1(b) (1968); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 72 (1977), 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1700-01; Reed
Sussman, An Employer’s Duty to Accommodate Its Employees’ Religious
Beliefs Under Title VII: Cook v. Chrysler Corporation, 35 B.C. L. REV. 532
(1994).
47
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. §
1605.1(b) (1968); see Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 72
(1977); Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1091 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1293 (1988) (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
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a religious accommodation. This change in language essentially
transformed the duty of the employer from a neutral duty, to an
affirmative one.48 The improved text of the 1967 Guidelines made
“clear that the Commission believed, contrary to its earlier view, that
in certain instances employers would be required to excuse employees
from work for religious observances.”49
E. Conscientious Objectors Revisited in Welsh v. United States, (1970)
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its analysis of sincere religious
belief from Seeger in Welsh v. United States. Welsh, like Seeger,
addressed a conscientious objector’s sincerely held religious beliefs. In
Welsh, the Court reversed the lower court’s decision and ruling due to
“its fundamental inconsistency with United States v. Seeger.”50 The
Welsh Court, much like the Seeger Court, presented a broad
understanding of what may constitute a sincere religious belief.
The Welsh Court found that whether the draft registrant
specifically referred to his or her belief as “religious” was “highly
unreliable” to the government agency or judicial fact finder that
ultimately determined whether the claim at issue was based on that
registrant’s sincerely held religious belief.51 This analysis was
analogous to the facts presented in Adeyeye. In Adeyeye, as described
in further detail below, the employee’s written requests for a leave of
absence did not explicitly state that his requirement to participate in
his father’s funeral ceremony was a religious obligation. However, in
congruence with the Supreme Court’s holding in Welsh, the Seventh
Circuit did not hold that the absence of any explicit reference to

48

Kaminer, supra note 13, at 581.
Id. at 581-82 (citing Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,
86 n.1 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
50
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970) (citing United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 396 U.S. 816
(1969)).
51
Welsh, 398 U.S. at 341.
49
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religion in Adeyeye’s written requests would bar him from receiving a
reasonable accommodation.
As with employees requesting a religious accommodation, with
respect to conscientious objectors, “very few registrants [we]re fully
aware of the broad scope of the word ‘religious’ as used in [the
applicable and pertinent statute], and accordingly a registrant’s
statement that his beliefs are nonreligious is a highly unreliable guide
for those charged with administering the exemption.”52 The Welsh
Court highlighted the potential for a draft registrant or employee’s lack
of familiarity with the standards regarding the sincerity of religious
beliefs. In doing so, the Court emphasized the need for a broad
understanding of religion with respect to the exact language expressed
in a conscientious objection to military service or a request for
religious accommodation in the workplace. A finder of fact must be
open to a broad conceptualization of religion to properly analyze
whether a request is sincerely based in that requester’s understanding
of religion.
For example, although Welsh “originally characterized his beliefs
as nonreligious, he later upon reflection wrote a long and thoughtful
letter to his Appeal Board in which he declared that his beliefs were
‘certainly religious in the ethical sense of the word.’”53 Similarly, in
Adeyeye, the employee, in his two letters to Heartland requesting a
leave of absence, did not clarify that his requests were based on his
sincerely held religious beliefs.54 As in Welsh, the Seventh Circuit
likewise did not require that Adeyeye explicitly include that his

52

Id.
Id. at 341-42 (“He explained: ‘I believe I mentioned taking of life as
not being, for me, a religious wrong. Again, I assumed Mr. (Bradey, the
Department of Justice hearing officer) was using the word ‘religious’ in the
conventional sense, and, in order to be perfectly honest did not characterize
my belief as ‘religious.’ App. 44.”).
54
See Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 450 (7th
Cir. 2013).
53
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particular requests were religious for the court to reach that
appropriate conclusion on its own.55
F. The 1972 Amendments to Title VII
The 1972 Amendment to Title VII addressed the disparity
between preventing religious discrimination and requiring adherence
to religious tolerance in the work place by incorporating “an
affirmative duty of accommodation” into Title VII’s definition of
religion.56 While “Congress had declared religious discrimination in
employment unlawful” via Title VII, Congressional Representatives
had not addressed an employer’s scope of duty with respect to
religious accommodation under Title VII, and notably did not
“indicate if an employer had an affirmative duty to accommodate
employee religious practices.”57 Influenced by the 1967 EEOC
Guidelines written in response to the Act, the United States Congress
codified the change in the amended language of the 1967 EEOC
Guidelines by enacting section 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act in
1972.58 “[B]y amending section 701 of Title VII in accordance with
the 1967 Guidelines of the EEOC,” Congress attempted to resolve the
disparity between the EEOC Guidelines and the contrasting holdings
of some of the federal courts.59 This section defined “[t]he term
‘religion’ [to] include[] all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrate[d] that he
[was] unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s religious
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the
55

Id.
Kaminer, supra note 13, at 580.
57
Zablotsky, supra note 28, at 513-14.
58
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994); Kaminer, supra note 13, at 583-84.
59
Zablotsky, supra note 28, at 515; Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982); see 118 CONG. REC. 705-06
(1972) (remarks of Sen. Randolph); Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63, 76 (1977); Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1088 (6th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1293 (1988).
56
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employer’s business.”60 This language, embedded in the Act’s
definition of religion, became the controlling language for federal
courts’ analysis of religious accommodation in the workplace, and was
consequently the standard applied by the Seventh Circuit in Adeyeye.
“In effect, the definition of religious discrimination as contained in the
amendment made it an unlawful employment practice under … Title
VII for an employer not to reasonably accommodate, in the absence of
undue hardship to the employer’s business, the religious practices of
his employees.”61 This section was added in 1972 to illuminate the
meaning of religious discrimination under the statute.62
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in TWA v. Hardison, reluctantly
noted, “like the EEOC Guidelines, the [1972 amendment to Title VII]
provide[d] no guidance for determining the degree of accommodation
that is required of an employer. The brief legislative history of § 701(j)
is likewise of little assistance in this regard.”63 Ultimately, while the
1972 amendment did follow the legislators’ intention to clarify and
strengthen an employer’s obligation to accommodate religious
requests, the Court found that the amended language of the statute had
not provided an ultimate and final determination regarding the
required degree of accommodation. In an important footnote, the TWA
Court elaborated on the legislative history of section 701(j)’s
definition of religion to accurately interpret the legislature’s intentions
and full meaning of “religious accommodation.”64

60

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994); Kaminer, supra note 13, at 583-84; see
also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977).
According to the remarks of Sen. Randolph, Congress included the following
definition of religion in its 1972 amendments to Title VII “[i]n part ‘to
resolve by legislation’ some of the issues raised in Dewey.” 118 CONG. REC.
706 (1972).
61
Zablotsky, supra note 28, at 515.
62
See generally id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
63
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).
64
Id. at 74 n. 9.
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The Court explained that “[s]ection 701(j) was added to the 1972
amendments on the floor of the Senate.”65 The TWA opinion continued
by noting that the brief floor debate in the Senate regarding the 1972
amendment’s definition of religion comprised the majority of section
701(j)’s legislative history.66 That brief Senate floor debate consisted
“principally of the views of the proponent of the measure, Senator
Jennings Randolph.”67 “When Congress was reviewing Title VII in
1972, Senator Jennings Randolph informed the Congress of these
decisions,” improperly addressing unequal treatment of employees
rather than the undue hardship of the employer, “which, he said, had
‘clouded’ the meaning of religious discrimination. He introduced an
amendment, tracking the language of the EEOC regulation, to make
clear that Title VII requires religious accommodation, even though
unequal treatment would result.”68 Left with limited guidance from the
1972 Amendment to Title VII, to formulate the appropriate
methodology, the Seventh Circuit borrowed its analysis of religious
accommodation from the statute, case law and EEOC Guidelines.

65

Id.
Id.; 118 CONG. REC. 705-706 (1972).
67
118 CONG. REC. 705-706 (1972). Ultimately in TWA, the Supreme
Court found “that TWA made reasonable efforts to accommodate”
Hardison’s request for religious accommodation, “and that each of the Court
of Appeals’ suggested alternatives would have been an undue hardship
within the meaning of the statute as construed by the EEOC Guidelines.”
TWA, 432 U.S. at 77.
68
TWA, 432 U.S. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 118 CONG. REC. 706
(1972).
66
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III. HEARTLAND’S REFUSAL TO ACCOMMODATE ADEYEYE’S REQUEST
FOR LEAVE OF ABSENCE TO ATTEND AND PARTICIPATE IN HIS FATHER’S
FUNERAL CEREMONIES AND RITUALS IN NIGERIA
A. Summary of the Facts in Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC
Sikiru Adeyeye was born in Nigeria and relocated to the United
States in 2008.69 Sometime after his arrival in the U.S., Adeyeye began
working for Heartland Sweeteners, LLC (“Heartland”), and was
employed by Heartland from as late as July 2008 until October 2008.70
Following the death of his father, Adeyeye “requested several weeks
of unpaid leave so he could travel to Nigeria to lead his father’s burial
rites.”71 In his two separate written requests to Heartland, written in
July and September of 2010, Adeyeye asked Heartland for sufficient
time off from work in order to travel to Nigeria to participate in his
father’s funeral ceremonies.72 In those written requests Adeyeye
stressed the significance of participating in his father’s funeral
ceremonies. He indicated that his involvement “was ‘compulsory’ and
that if he failed to lead the burial rites, he and his family members
would suffer at least spiritual death.”73 “Adeyeye identified these
religious rites in his letters requesting unpaid leave, quoted [below], as
well as in his deposition and declaration. They included leading an
extended procession through the village, animal sacrifice in the form
of killing five goats, and cutting off his mother’s hair and anointing
her head twice with snail oil while she remained secluded in her home
for one month of mourning until Adeyeye coaxed her to exit her home
and to reenter society.”74 Although Heartland denied Adeyeye’s
69

Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 447 (7th Cir.

2013).
70

Id. (“Adeyeye was born in Nigeria and lived there until he moved to
the United States as a legal permanent resident in 2008.”).
71
Id.
72
Id. at 450-51.
73
Id. at 447.
74
Id. at 452.
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request for a leave of absence, he still chose to travel to Nigeria in
order to participate in the funeral ceremonies for his father, and
consequently, he did not appear for work during this absence. As a
result of his leave of absence, Adeyeye was terminated by Heartland
when he attempted to return to work after travelling back to the United
States from Nigeria.75
In the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of whether Adeyeye clearly
communicated the religious nature of his request to his employers, the
court looked to the letters that Adeyeye sent to Heartland regarding his
request for a leave of absence. His first written request, dated July 19,
2010, stated:
I hereby request for five weeks leave in order to attend
funeral ceremony of my father. This is very important for me
to be there in order to participate in the funeral rite according
to our custom and tradition. The ceremony usually cover
from three to four weeks and is two weeks after the burial,
there is certain rite[s] that all of the children must participate.
And after the third week, my mother will not come out until
after one month when I have to be there to encourage her, and
I have to [k]ill five goats, then she can now come out. This is
done compulsory for the children so that the death will not
come or take away any of the children's life. I will appreciate
if this request is approved.76
This request was denied, and Adeyeye submitted a second letter to
Heartland on September 15, 2010, stating:
I hereby request for my one week vacation and three weeks
leave in order to attend the funeral ceremony of my father in
my country, Nigeria—Africa, which is taking place by
October next month. This is the second time I will inform you
and request for this travelling trip from the company but no
75
76

Id. at 447, 450-51.
Id. at 450.
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reply to this matter. Nevertheless, the burial will be taking
place by October next month and I have to be there and
involved totally in this burial ceremony being the first child
and the only son of the family. I therefore request for this
period stated above for this trip and back to my work by
November 4th, 2010. Your help towards this matter will
highly be appreciated.77
In this second request, although Adeyeye “reduced his request
from five weeks of unpaid leave to one week of (already earned)
vacation and three weeks of unpaid leave,” his request for a leave of
absence was again denied.78
Adeyeye filed his lawsuit against Heartland under Title VII,
claiming that Heartland failed to accommodate his request for a leave
of absence prompted by his religious obligations surrounding the
funeral ceremony for his father.79 The district court eventually granted
Heartland’s motion for summary judgment, “finding that Adeyeye’s
two written requests did not present evidence sufficient for a
reasonable jury to find that he had provided Heartland notice of the
religious character of his request for unpaid leave.”80 Adeyeye
appealed the district court’s granting of Heartland’s motion for
summary judgment, and the Seventh Circuit heard that appeal.
B. The Holding from Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC
Hon. David Frank Hamilton authored and wrote the Seventh
Circuit’s opinion in this case, a unanimous decision. Hon. Diane S.
Sykes and Hon. Joseph Peter Stadtmueller of the United States District
Court, Eastern Wisconsin, sitting by designation, comprised the panel.
The decision was made on July 31, 2013. The judgment of the district
court was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings
77

Id.
Id.
79
Id. at 447.
80
Id.
78
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consistent with the opinion. The Seventh Circuit held that Adeyeye’s
lawsuit against Heartland should survive Heartland’s motion for
summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether Adeyeye provided Heartland with sufficient notice
of his need for a leave of absence and whether that leave of absence
was requested based on Adeyeye’s own sincere religious beliefs.81 The
court found that Adeyeye’s letters to Heartland requesting a leave of
absence were “sufficient to present a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether Heartland had notice of the religious nature of the
request.”82 Moreover, the court held that Adeyeye’s “discharge was a
result of his religious observance” and that his particular religious
accommodation of unpaid leave and vacation “would not have created
an undue hardship on” Heartland.”83 Consequently, the Seventh
Circuit reversed and remanded the opinion of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.84
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION AND
INTERPRETATION OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION UNDER TITLE VII IN
ADEYEYE
A. Adeyeye Presented a Prima Facie Title VII Case
Adeyeye satisfied the three-part test necessary to establish a prima
facie case that Heartland failed to accommodate his religious
observance.85 First, he demonstrated that he had a sincere or bona fide
81

See generally id.
Id. at 447.
83
See generally id.
84
Id. at 447-48.
85
Kaminer, supra note 13, at 596-97; see Opuku-Boateng v. California,
95 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d
1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also Protos v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
797 F.2d 129, 133 (3rd Cir. 1986), Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d
1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987); see also 1 Fair Empl. Prac. § 8:69 (internal
citations omitted).
82
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religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with an employment
duty or job requirement.86 Second, he informed Heartland of his
religious observance’s conflict with his work schedule via two
separate written requests.87 Third and finally, Heartland “nevertheless
enforced the job requirement against the employee, disciplined the
employee for failing to comply with the conflicting requirement, or
took other adverse employment action against the employee.”88
To begin its analysis, the Seventh Circuit found that “Adeyeye’s
claim for failure to accommodate his religion [was] straightforward,”
noting that Adeyeye “assert[ed] that his request for unpaid leave was
motivated by his own genuine, sincerely held religious beliefs that he
had to perform his father’s burial rites.”89 The court recognized that
Adeyeye “provided … Heartland ample notice that he sought unpaid
leave for religious reasons. He then missed work to perform the burial
rites and was fired because of this absence.”90 Importantly, “[o]nce the
plaintiff has established a prima facie case of religious
discrimination,” as Adeyeye did, “the burden then shifts to the
employer to produce evidence showing that it cannot reasonably
accommodate the worker without incurring undue hardship.”91 These
facts supporting Adeyeye’s prima facie case ultimately supported the
Seventh Circuit’s decision to reverse the district court’s grant of
Heartland’s motion for summary judgment.
B. The Definition and Interpretation of Religion
Often the religiousness of the employee’s request for
accommodation is straightforward and does not come into question.
86

Kaminer, supra note 13, at 596-97.
Id.
88
1 Fair Emp. Prac. § 8:69 (internal citations omitted).
89
Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 449.
90
Id.
91
Protos, 797 F.2d at 134; see also Smith, 827 F.2d at 1085; OpukuBoateng, 95 F.3d at 1468; Heller, 8 F.3d at 1438 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
87
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For example, an employee may request a change in work schedule due
to his or her weekly Sabbath observance. In that instance, the
religiousness of that employee’s request for accommodation is clear
because the employee’s religion instructed the employee to refrain
from working on the Sabbath. Where the religiousness of the
employee’s request for accommodation is ambiguous, the EEOC has
applied a broad definition of religion, and “define[d] religious
practices to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and
wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional
religious views.”92 The equally accepting statutory definition of
religion “includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as
well as belief.”93
In Adeyeye, the court found that Title VII’s definition of religion
encompassed three points.94 First, the statutory definition provided “a
broad substantive definition of religion.”95 Second, the statute
incorporated “an implied duty to accommodate employees’
religions.”96 Third and lastly, the statute contained “an explicit
affirmative defense for failure-to-accommodate claims if the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer.”97
Each of those points contained within Title VII’s applicable and
pertinent definition of “religion” will be addressed below.

92

Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of Provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.) and Implementing Provisions, Making Religious
Discrimination in the Workplace Unlawful, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 580 (1975); see
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 163 (1965), rev’d on other grounds,
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), as stated in, United States ex
rel. Foster v. Schlesinger, 520 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
93
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 448.
94
Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 448 (“The statutory definition of “religion” in
Title VII is drafted as an unusual blend.”).
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
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The Adeyeye court deconstructed the analysis of “whether a belief
is in fact religious for purposes of Title VII” to three factors.98 First,
the court asked whether the belief “must actually be religious.”99
Second, the court investigated whether the “belief must be sincerely
held.”100 Third, and lastly, the court looked to whether the
accommodation of that belief “impose[d] an undue hardship on the
employer.”101 The distinction between the analysis of religiousness
and sincerity is an important one. In most cases, courts should not
analyze religiousness, but it is permissible, and possibly necessary for
courts to analyze sincerity. As laid out in Adeyeye, “proof of a sincere
religious belief is the first element of the prima facie case that an
employee must show in order to be successful under Title VII.”102
Notably, courts are often wary of stepping outside of their proper
judicial boundaries to analyze the religiousness of an employee’s
request, and instead focus their evaluation on facts supporting or
refuting that employee’s sincerity in his or her chosen religious
tradition. While courts attempt to remain outside of the determination
of the religiosity of an individual’s belief, courts “are willing to
consider the sincerity of any purported belief.”103 Here, courts have
found that “[p]roving the sincerity of one’s belief is part of
establishing that one has a bona fide religious belief.”104 In analyzing
98

Id.
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. (citing Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901 n. 12 (7th
Cir.1978)).
102
Likins, supra note 18, at 116-17; see Andrew M. Campbell, What
Constitutes Employer’s Reasonable Accommodation of Employee’s Religious
Preferences Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 134 A.L.R. FED. 26
(1996).
103
Likins, supra note 18; see Susannah P. Mroz, True Believers?:
Problems of Definition in Title VII Religious Discrimination Jurisprudence,
39 IND. L. REV. 145, 156-67 (2005).
104
Likins, supra note 18; see Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v.
Union Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, 279
99
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sincerity, an employer may challenge an employee’s claim for
religious accommodation by “demonstrating that the employee’s
conduct has been inconsistent with or contrary to the asserted
belief.”105
With the separation between analyzing religiousness and sincerity
in mind, the Seventh Circuit noted in analyzing sincerity that the
finder of fact should not evaluate that belief as being “orthodox or
even mandated by an organized religious hierarchy.”106 This approach
permits a variety of religious traditions to qualify as sincere under
Title VII, whether those traditions comply with commonly held
religious doctrine or are exclusive and particular to the employee
whose request for accommodation is at issue. By acknowledging
personal religious traditions alongside commonly accepted religious
traditions, the Seventh Circuit signified its broader understanding of
religion under Title VII. It progressed from the Supreme Court’s
analysis in Seeger and Welsh, where the various religious beliefs at
issue were directly compared to a belief in God or a supreme being.
With the proper analysis, the sincerity of the belief is based on that
individual’s inner convictions rather than established religious
traditions or commonly held beliefs. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit
found that “[c]ourts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs
because the believer admits that he is ‘struggling’ with his position or
because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision
that a more sophisticated person might employ.”107
The Adeyeye court applied a broad analysis of an employee’s
sincere religious belief by holding that the belief’s consistency with or
F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2002); Hussein v. Waldorf-Astoria, 134 F. Supp. 2d
591, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
105
Likins, supra note 18; see Peter M. Panken, Religion and the
Workplace: Harmonizing Work and Worship 2, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STUDY MATERIALS, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 4
n.10 (2005).
106
Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 452 (7th Cir.
2013).
107
Id. at 452-53; Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec.
Division, 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981).
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adherence to any predetermined orthodoxy or established religious
tradition need not be a determining factor in the sincerity of that
belief.108 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit found that an individual’s
belief need not be perfectly consistent “in observance, practice, and
interpretation” with his or her own religious observances, practices
and interpretations “when determining if a belief system qualifies as a
religion or whether a person’s belief is sincere.”109 The court found
that a broader interpretation of sincere religious beliefs permitted a
flexible understanding of any person’s religious traditions,
observances or practices.110 In addition, this approach prevented courts
from interfering in an ultimately impracticable and futile analysis of
whether an individual’s beliefs adhere to their own practices, or the
established practices of any one religious tradition.111
Less common religious observances and practices, such as the
Nigerian funeral traditions at issue in Adeyeye, compelled the court to
apply a broader understanding of those religious traditions in order to
apply the Act evenly to all requests for religious accommodation
rooted in sincere religious beliefs. “The Act protects not only orthodox
religious beliefs, observances, and practices, but also those which are
unorthodox and which might be characterized by most persons as
mistaken or incomprehensible.”112 In order to properly analyze the
sincerity of less common religious beliefs, courts must construe

108

Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 453.
Id.
110
Id. (stating “[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”)
(citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Division, 450
U.S. at 716); see also Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 454–55 (7th Cir.
2012) (“[A] sincere religious believer doesn't forfeit his religious rights
merely because he is not scrupulous in his observance; for where would
religion be without its backsliders, penitents, and prodigal sons?”).
111
Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 453.
112
Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of Provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.) and Implementing Provisions, Making Religious
Discrimination in the Workplace Unlawful, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 580 (1975).
109
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religion and religious beliefs more broadly.113 The court in Adeyeye
found that “a genuinely held belief that involves matters of the
afterlife, spirituality, or the soul, among other possibilities, qualifies as
religion under Title VII.”114 The court recognized that while “the
religious beliefs and practices Adeyeye referred to are not as familiar
as beliefs and practices closer to the modern American mainstream[,]
… the protections of Title VII are not limited to familiar religions.”115
In order for Adeyeye’s claim to survive summary judgment,
Adeyeye had to show that his religious beliefs were religious in his
“own scheme of things” and that this religious belief was “sincerely
held.”116 The court concluded that Adeyeye presented sufficient
evidence “to show that Adeyeye’s religious request to attend his
father’s funeral in Nigeria so that he could perform specific rites,
traditions, and customs was borne from his own personally and
sincerely held religious beliefs.”117 Adeyeye explained in his
deposition testimony and declaration that his “family’s religion is a
blend of Christianity and customs, traditions, and ceremonial rites
developed in his Nigerian village.”118 A significant aspect of
Adeyeye’s religion is that “the specific dictates of [his] family’s
113

Kramer, supra note 112.
Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 448; see Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d
678, 681 (7th Cir.2005) (“[W]hen a person sincerely holds beliefs dealing
with issues of ultimate concern that for her occupy a place parallel to that
filled by God in traditionally religious persons, those beliefs represent her
religion.”) (internal quotations and ellipses omitted).
115
Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 451; see Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d
897, 900-01 (7th Cir. 1978) (Title VII protects conduct that is “religiously
motivated” and includes “all forms and aspects of religion, however
eccentric”) (quoting Cooper v. General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163, 168 (5th
Cir.1976)).
116
Redmond, 574 F.2d at 901 n. 12 (internal quotations omitted); see
also Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 451.
117
Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 451-52 (“That is to say, a jury could find that
for Adeyeye to observe his religion appropriately, it was necessary for him to
participate in the burial ceremonies.”).
118
Id. at 452.
114
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religious practice[s] are identified, determined, and required by [his]
father.” Therefore, Adeyeye has incorporated his father’s “rites and
traditions” as a necessary element of his own religious practices and
observances.119 Adeyeye clarified his simultaneous practice and belief
in both his Christian and Nigerian religious traditions, stating:
The Christian religion in which [he] was raised incorporates
the traditional rites and customs of my village and family.
Under these traditions, my father, as the head of the family,
determined the religious practices, beliefs and customs for his
household. I believe that I was spiritually compelled to follow
these practices, beliefs, and customs in connection with the
death and burial of my father.120
The court explained this as “an inter-generational form of faith and
practice where part of the belief system is that the head of each
household has the privilege and responsibility of determining the
family’s exact practices.”121
Adeyeye clarified that his Christian and Nigerian religious
traditions were interconnected. Those simultaneous traditions
established his identity as a Christian and provided a sincere religious
belief in the Nigerian traditions surrounding his father’s funeral, as
well as his devout need to participate in that ceremony. Adeyeye
stressed the sincerity of his request by explaining “the spiritual
consequences of his failure to carry out his father's burial rites.”122 He
asserted that he “was compelled by [his] religious beliefs to follow the
traditional rites and customs established by [his] father as head of the

119

Id. (“Adeyeye explained this in his deposition: ‘I have to go to
Nigeria to go to perform my rites. Being my rites—what I mean by rite, we
have a customary rite, our whole culture. So being the main child of the
family, so I have to go there and perform a rite.’”).
120
Id. at 453.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 451-52.
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household in connection with [his] father’s death and funeral.”123 In
addition, he stated that “if [he] failed to follow these rites, [his]
father’s death would have brought spiritual death upon both [his]
mother and [him]self and would have prevented [he and his] mother
… from finding spiritual peace.”124 The Seventh Circuit recognized
that these statements showed that Adeyeye’s request to travel to
Nigeria for his father’s funeral was deeply rooted in his own religious
traditions and sincere religious beliefs.
Describing his role in the traditional Nigerian funeral practices in
further detail, “Adeyeye explained that as the first son, he was
required both to cut his mother’s hair and to ensure that she exited her
home a month later ‘so that she will not be disgraced … and the death
will not come upon her.’” 125 According to Adeyeye’s religious beliefs,
if he did not participate in his father’s funeral ceremony, the spirits of
his deceased ancestors would lie, as heavy spiritual weight, on
himself, his siblings, and his mother.126 Adeyeye, his siblings and his
mother needed to perform the necessary traditional Nigerian funeral
rites “to avoid disgrace and to avoid the [spiritual] death of [his]
mother[;] … his attendance was mandatory ‘so that the death will not
come or take away any of the children's life.’”127
The Adeyeye opinion includes a particular instruction from the
Bible, to “honor thy father and thy mother.”128 In full, this verse, in the
book of Exodus, reads, “Honour thy father and thy mother: that thy
days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth
thee.”129 Alternatively, in the book of Deutoronomy, this verse states,
“Honour thy father and thy mother, as the Lord thy God hath
commanded thee; that thy days may be prolonged, and that it may go

123

Id. at 453-54.
Id. at 454.
125
Id. at 454 n. 3.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 454.
129
Exodus 20:12 (King James).
124
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well with thee, in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.”130 The
Seventh Circuit’s inclusion of this Bible verse is particularly pertinent
to Adeyeye’s request for religious accommodation. The passage
highlights both the purpose of Adeyeye’s request to Heartland—to
honor his father by participating in the traditional Nigerian funeral
ceremonies—as well as Adeyeye’s simultaneous observance of both
his Christian religion and traditional Nigerian customs.
The teaching from the Bible, to honor thy father and thy mother,
represents Adeyeye’s simultaneous adherence to two religious
traditions. By participating in his father’s funeral ceremony with his
mother, Adeyeye acted in accordance with his Nigerian traditions, and,
in doing so, recognized his Christianity by honoring his father and
mother. Heartland, as well as the district court, found that Adeyeye’s
request to participate in the Nigerian traditions of his father’s funeral
was not sufficiently connected to Adeyeye’s personal and sincere
Christian beliefs to warrant religious accommodation. By highlighting
the phrase “honor thy father and thy mother” in the Adeyeye opinion,
the Seventh Circuit emphasized that a genuine issue of material fact
remained as to whether Adeyeye held sincere religious beliefs with
respect to both Nigerian and Christian traditions. That particular lesson
from the Bible elucidated the harmony and sincerity of Adeyeye’s
Nigerian and Christian religious traditions. Moreover, by finding that
Adeyeye’s request for accommodation may have been reasonable and
did not impose an undue hardship on Heartland, the Seventh Circuit
incorporated this broad and accepting understanding of diverse and
unique, but still sincere, religious beliefs into their overall analysis of
religious accommodation.
C. The Definition and Interpretation of Religious Accommodation
Some legal commentators have determined that even after Title
VII’s amendment in 1972, Congress failed to resolve “the definition of
reasonable accommodation as that term is used in section 701(j) and

130

Deuteronomy 5:16 (King James).
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relates to section 703(a)(1) of Title VII.”131 While the 1972
amendment may have failed to elaborate on the meaning of Title VII,
importantly, “the amendment [does clarify] that an employer has an
affirmative obligation to act.”132 However, “[t]he amendment offers no
guidance regarding the extent of the effort required, i.e., guidance with
respect to what effort is a reasonable effort.”133 The 1972 Amendment
to Title VII made clear that an employer’s reasonable accommodation
to an employee’s religious request was an affirmative duty, but the
amendment did not prescribe any standards for what that reasonable
accommodation might entail.
Generally, federal courts have interpreted the reasonable effort of
an employer’s accommodation to be a minimal effort.134 This
application of a minimal accommodation standard may be due to the
influence of the Supreme Court’s decision in Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison (“TWA”), where the court “narrowly interpreted an
employer’s obligation to accommodate a religious employee” when it
“addressed the scope of § 701(j).”135 A close analysis of the Supreme
Court’s narrow interpretations of religious accommodation in TWA, in
contrast to the Seventh Circuit’s broad interpretation in Adeyeye,
emphasizes courts’ progression towards greater freedom of religious
observance and practice, as well as an expanded acceptance of
religious traditions.

131

Zablotsky, supra note 28, at 521.
Id.
133
Id.
134
Kaminer, supra note 13, at 577 (“The lower courts have, for the most
part, interpreted § 701(j) as requiring only a minimal level of
accommodation of religious employees.”).
135
Id.
132
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1. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Religious Accommodation
Under Title VII in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, (1977)
In TWA, the employee requested that his employer not schedule
him to work on Saturdays, his religion’s Sabbath.136 Ultimately, “no
accommodation could be reached, and [the employee] was discharged
for refusing to work on Saturdays.”137 In response to his termination,
the employee “brought an action for injunctive relief against TWA …
claiming that his discharge constituted religious discrimination in
violation of s 703(a)(1) of the Act, which makes it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an
employee on the basis of his religion.”138
The Supreme Court clearly stated that “[t]he issue in [TWA was]
the extent of the employer’s obligation under Title VII to
accommodate an employee whose religious beliefs prohibit him from
working on Saturdays.”139 The employee’s “claim of religious
discrimination was based on the 1967 [EEOC] Guidelines in effect at
the time requiring an employer, short of ‘undue hardship,’ to make
‘reasonable accommodations’ to the religious needs of its employees,
and on similar language in the 1972 amendments to Title VII.”140 The

136

See generally Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63

(1977).
137

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 63 (1977) (“Hardison, having first invoked the administrative
remedy provided by Title VII, brought this action for injunctive relief in the
United States District Court against TWA … claiming that his discharge by
TWA constituted religious discrimination in violation of Title VII.”).
139
TWA, 432 U.S. at 66.
140
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1970 ed., Supp. V); 29 CFR § 1605.1 (1968);
TWA, 432 U.S. at 63-64. Initially, employee plaintiff “invoked the
administrative remedy provided by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.” “Hardison’s claim of religious discrimination rested on 1967 EEOC
Guidelines requiring employers ‘to make reasonable accommodations to the
religious needs of employees’ whenever such accommodation would not
138
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Court ultimately held that “it would be anomalous to conclude that by
‘reasonable accommodations’ Congress meant that an employer must
deny the shift and job preferences of some employees, as well as
deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or
prefer the religious needs of others.”141 The TWA Court stated that
Title VII “makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to discriminate against an employee or a prospective employee on the
basis of his or her religion.”142 The Court took note of the EEOC’s
Guidelines requiring “that an employer, short of ‘undue hardship,’
make ‘reasonable accommodations’ to the religious needs of its
employees.”143 The Court also recognized that the Act had adopted the
language of those EEOC Guidelines.144
With this holding, the Court essentially applied an outdated
standard of religious accommodation. This standard improperly
focused on an employer’s efforts on maintaining equal employment
standards for all employees, regardless of their religion.145 This
holding was in stark contrast to the appropriate standard emphasized in
the later EEOC Guidelines and amendments to Title VII. That proper
standard permitted the unequal treatment of employees in order to
reasonably accommodate certain employees’ religious practices. The
TWA Court erred by ignoring the EEOC Guidelines and instead
applying this outdated interpretation of religious accommodation
under Title VII.
The Court found that “Title VII does not contemplate [the]
unequal treatment” of employees that may result from a particular

work an ‘undue hardship,’ and on similar language adopted by Congress in
the 1972 amendments to Title VII.”
141
TWA, 432 U.S. at 64.
142
Section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 78 Stat.
255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); TWA, 432 U.S. at 66.
143
29 CFR § 1605.1(b) (1968); TWA, 432 U.S. at 66.
144
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1970 ed., Supp. V); TWA, 432 U.S. at 66.
145
TWA, 432 U.S. at 64. (“Title VII does not require an employer to go
that far. Pp. 2274-2275.”).
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employee’s request for religious accommodation.146 It emphasized that
their interpretation and application of Title VII to prevent unequal
treatment aimed to eliminate employment discrimination “when it is
directed against majorities as well as minorities.”147 In doing so, the
Court concluded that if TWA reasonably accommodated one
employee’s request for a weekly Sabbath observance, they would
accordingly “deny the shift and job preference of some employees …
in order to accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others.”148
The Court found that this denial of scheduling preferences to some
employees to accommodate the religious request of another employee
was not reasonable, and instead qualified as an undue hardship on the
employer, finding that “Title VII does not require an employer to go
that far.”149 In contrast to the Court’s narrow reading of Title VII in
TWA, later interpretations of religious accommodation, such as the
Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Adeyeye, appropriately incorporated both
the EEOC Guidelines and the 1972 amendment to reach a broader
understanding of religious accommodation that complies with the
statute as well as the First Amendment.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented from the
majority’s opinion in TWA.150 Their dissent promotes a broad
interpretation of religious accommodation under Title VII, evidently
placing an affirmative duty on employers to accommodate employees’
religious requests. Justice Marshall’s methodology is aligned with the
Seventh Circuit’s approach in Adeyeye, rather that the Supreme
Court’s approach in TWA.
Justice Marshall noted that difficulties with religious
accommodation and discrimination under Title VII often arise with
regard to “adherents to minority faiths who do not observe the holy
days on which most businesses are closed,” and instead “need time off

146

TWA, 432 U.S. at 81.
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 85 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
147
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for their own days of religious observance.”151 Marshall’s approach to
minority religions is particularly relevant in TWA, as well as in
Adeyeye. Justice Marshall accurately concluded that religious
accommodation resulting in certain unequal treatment is acceptable
under Title VII, and should even be expected in cases regarding the
accommodation of a minority religion. Justice Marshall explained that
where an “employee is to be exempt” from a particular work schedule,
that exemption “will always result in a privilege being ‘allocated
according to religious beliefs,’” unless the employer permits that
exemption for their entire staff.152 For example, closing a business on
Sunday may accommodate the religious needs of many Christians who
observe their Sabbath. However, adherents to those minority religions
who observe their Sabbath on a day of the week other than Sunday, a
tradition that affects some sects of Christianity, are left without
appropriate religious accommodations for observing their Sabbath.
Justice Marshall consequently found that “if an accommodation
can be rejected simply because it involves preferential treatment, then
the regulation and the statute, while brimming with ‘sound and fury,’
ultimately ‘signif[y] nothing.’”153 In this fashion, Justice Marshall
found that religious accommodation, especially for minority religions,
would inevitably lead to some unequal treatment amongst employees.
He further noted that this unequal treatment was not prohibited by
Title VII, and in fact may be necessary to reasonably accommodate
religious requests and to preserve religious freedom without imposing
undue hardship on the employer. The appropriate standard is not
whether the religious accommodation causes unequal treatment
amongst the employees, but whether the religious accommodation
causes undue hardship for the employer.154

151

Id.
Id. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
153
Id. at 85 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
154
Id. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In each instance, the question is
whether the statute says, in plain words, … that such allocations are required
unless ‘undue hardship’ would result.”).
152
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2. Religious Accommodation in Adeyeye
To begin its analysis of Adeyeye’s request for religious
accommodation from Heartland, the Seventh Circuit applied the threepart analysis it previously utilized in Porter v. City of Chicago.155 In
Porter, the Seventh Circuit found that an employee must prove three
things in order to present a sufficient claim that the employer failed to
accommodate that employee’s religious request.156 First, the employee
must show that “the observance or practice conflicting with an
employment requirement is religious in nature.”157 Second, the
employee must have “called the religious observance or practice to
[the] employer’s attention.”158 And third, “the religious observance or
practice [must be] the basis for [the employee’s] discharge or other
discriminatory treatment.”159 As discussed below, Adeyeye clearly
satisfied all three of these requirements.
D. The Interpretation of Undue Hardship
Under Title VII, an employer is not obligated to accommodate any
and all of an employee’s requests for religious accommodation.
Instead, Title VII permits an employer to deny an employee’s request
for religious accommodation if that employer can show that
accommodating the request would impose an undue hardship on the
employer. Without this balance in Title VII, religious accommodation
would present a tremendous roadblock to otherwise functioning
businesses. Moreover, it is not unfair or unconstitutional for an
employer to deny the accommodation of an employee’s religious

155

Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir.2012) (internal
quotations omitted); see also Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721
F.3d 444, 449 (7th Cir. 2013).
156
Porter, 700 F.3d at 951.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
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request where that employee’s religious needs impose a substantial
burden or undue hardship on the employer.
1. The Demonstration of Actual Undue Hardship is Necessary
In the analysis of undue hardship under Title VII, an employer
must present evidence that the employer’s accommodation of the
employee’s religious request would cause, or has caused, an actual
undue hardship on the employer. Only after a showing of actual undue
hardship may an employer be exempt from complying with the
employee’s request for religious accommodation.160
There are a number of factors that may influence a court’s
analysis of whether an employee’s request for religious
accommodation presents actual undue hardship to an employer. Some
of those factors include: (1) violation of the “seniority provision of a
valid collective bargaining agreement”; (2) “suffering more than
minimal costs in terms of money or efficiency in attempting to replace
the absent worker”; or (3) “requiring employees of other religions or
nonreligious employees to work at times that are undesirable to them
in place of a worker who is absent because of a religious conflict with
work hours.”161 The costs of covering or replacing an absent worker
were particularly relevant to Heartland’s claim of undue hardship in
Adeyeye.

160

Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of Provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.) and Implementing Provisions, Making Religious
Discrimination in the Workplace Unlawful, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 580 (1975)
(commentators noted that “[a] refusal to accommodate is justified only when
an employer … can demonstrate that an undue hardship would in fact result
from each available alternative method of accommodation.”).
161
1 Fair Empl. Prac. § 8:69; Collective Bargaining Agreement:
E.E.O.C. v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 102 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961, 90 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 43094 (4th Cir. 2008).
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The court in Adeyeye analyzed Heartland’s potential undue
hardship based on Adeyeye’s specific position at Heartland.162 While
employed at Heartland, Adeyeye was a material handler and a
packer/palletizer.163 Significantly, the court noted, “that Heartland
expects and plans for high turnover of workers in both job categories
without compromising quality or productivity.”164 Due to Heartland’s
expectation of high turnover, Heartland could not meet the undue
hardship standard under Title VII. Because temporary workers could
readily replace Adeyeye’s position, Heartland was unable to show that
Adeyeye’s absence would inconvenience them to the level of undue
hardship.165 The Seventh Circuit consequently found that Heartland
did not present evidence showing that “any reasonable jury would
have to find that permitting Adeyeye to take three weeks of unpaid
leave in conjunction with his week of vacation would have created an
undue hardship for Heartland.”166
2. Heartland Sweeteners Was Unable to Show any Undue Hardship as
a Result of Adeyeye’s Request for Religious Accommodation
The Seventh Circuit noted that once Adeyeye has established his
prima facie case for religious accommodation, “the burden then shifts
to [Heartland,] to show that it could not accommodate the employee’s
religious belief or practice without causing the employer undue
hardship.”167 In Adeyeye’s second written request for religious
162

Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 455 (7th Cir.

2013).
163

Id.
Id.
165
Id. (“Heartland expected and planned for the frequent turnover of
employees by keeping a ready list of temporary workers who usually
reported to Heartland within an hour of a request.” In addition, the court
found that “Title VII requires proof not of minor inconveniences but of
hardship, and “undue” hardship at that.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j))).
166
Id.
167
Id. at 449 (citing Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 706 (7th Cir.1986)).
164
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accommodation, he presented Heartland with a suggestion to
accommodate his leave of absence, proposing that he may “take his
one week of vacation together with three weeks unpaid leave to allow
enough time to travel to Nigeria and participate in the burial rites.”168
Importantly, the Adeyeye Court’s analysis of undue hardship found that
“[t]he Supreme Court has recognized unpaid leave as a reasonable and
generally satisfactory form of accommodation for religious faith and
practice.”169
VI. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF TITLE VII IS THE
APPROPRIATE UNDERSTANDING OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION
The Seventh Circuit, by finding that Adeyeye had a claim for
religious accommodation that was sufficient to survive Heartland’s
motion for summary judgment, properly interpreted religious
accommodation under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit’s analysis of
Title VII in Adeyeye appropriately accentuated an accepting approach
to lesser-known minority religious traditions and a broad application
of an employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate an employee’s
religious request. This implementation of Title VII aptly followed the
amendments to Title VII as well as the EEOC Guidelines. In doing so,
the Seventh Circuit’s conclusions in Adeyeye were in congruence with
the trend towards greater religious acceptance and understanding as
reflected in the statutory language of Title VII and the evolution of the
EEOC guidelines regarding religious accommodation. Moreover, the
Seventh Circuit’s broad understanding of religious accommodation in
168

Id. at 455.
Id. (quoting Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70-71
(1986) (internal quotations omitted) (“The provision of unpaid leave
eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious
practices by allowing the individual to observe fully religious holy days and
requires him only to give up compensation for a day that he did not in fact
work. Generally speaking, the direct effect of unpaid leave is merely a loss of
income for the period the employee is not at work; such an exclusion has no
direct effect upon either employment opportunities or job status.”).
169
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Adeyeye promotes religious freedom in accordance with the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
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